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SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS
1. Permanent Partial Disability: The Industrial Commission's determination of Claimant's
permanent disability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-435 is supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
Permanent impairment (PPI) is an essential component of permanent disability (PPD).
The Commission's determination the Claimant suffered permanent partial disability
(PPD) of 25% is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
2. Retraining Benefits: The Commission's decision denying retraining benefits pursuant
to Idaho Code § 72-450 is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
3. Partial Finger Prosthesis: The Commission’s order on this issue was final as of
November 2, 2012, therefore appeal of this issue is not timely. (Claimant concedes this
point and withdraws this issue from this appeal.)
ARGUMENT
1. The Industrial Commission's determination that Respondents are entitled to a
credit for benefits paid for permanent impairment as against their liability for
permanent disability benefits is based upon a mistake of law.
It has long been the case in Idaho that benefits for permanent impairment are different that
benefits for permanent disability:
Under our compensation law, compensation is based upon loss of capacity to
earn. This loss is measured by what a workman of the same class and grade could
earn in the employment in which he was, under the conditions prevailing therein,
before and up to the time of the accident. (Flynn v. Carson, 42 Ida. 141, 243 P.
818.) In the case of Kelley v. Prouty, 54 Ida. 225, 30 P. (2d) 769, speaking of the
Act, we said: "But the general theory and spirit of the act, except for the specific
indemnities set forth in sec. 43-1113, is to the effect that compensation is
provided to make good the loss of the earning power or capacity to work on
account of the injury. In other words, our compensation act is to the same effect
as the laws of those states holding, as indicated in the above cited cases, that
compensation is to be paid on account of disability or impairment of ability to
work, or for loss of earning power, and not as indemnity for the loss of a member
or physical impairment as such, except the indemnities specified in sec. 43-1113."
Herman v. Sunset Mercantile Co., 66 Idaho 47, 54, 154 P.2d 487, 490, (1944).
The Idaho Industrial Commission held that Respondents receive a credit for PPI benefits
paid for a permanent impairment as against benefits for permanent partial disability, contrary to
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this Court's holdings in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, (2014), and

Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d 1261, (2017). R. 213,223 Vol. 2.
Respondents argue that Claimant's reliance upon Corgatelli and Davis is misplaced, as those
decisions have been "scrutinized and limited to their facts." Respondents argue that, in
particular, the logic of Corgatelli and Davis have been limited to cases involving total and
permanent disability pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408.
In pertinent part, Corgatelli states:
Examining worker's compensation law as a whole, Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 141
Idaho 524, 528, 112 P.3d 812, 816 (2005), this Court finds that there is no
statutory basis for the Commission to award Steel West a credit for permanent
physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli. Idaho Code section
72-408, which awards the employee income benefits for permanent disability,
only offers a deduction "on account of the waiting period." The current version of
the statute provides for no other deductions. Notably, an earlier version ofldaho
Code section 72-408, then-codified at Idaho Code section 72-3 lO(a), allowed for
a deduction for "partial disability" along with the waiting period deduction. LC.
§72-130(a) (1969); see also Endicott v. Potlach Forests, 69 Idaho 450,452,208
P.2d 803, 804 (1949). However, this statute was repealed in 1971 when the
Legislature recodified Idaho's worker's compensation law. Ch. 124, §1, 1971
Idaho Sess. Laws 422, 424. Thus, the current version of Idaho Code section 72408, which provides for the employee such as Corgatelli to receive total and
permanent disability benefits, includes no deduction or credit for previously paid
permanent impairment benefits in its award of disability benefits.
The other relevant statute for the award of disability benefits, Idaho Code section
72-406(2), allows for a deduction of previously paid "permanent disability"
benefits for an injury to any member or part of the Claimant's body from a new
award of permanent disability benefits, but only if the new benefits are provided
"to the same member or part of his body caused by a change in his physical
condition or by a subsequent injury or occupational disease." LC. §72-406(2).
Although partial permanent disability benefits are calculated in relation to
permanent physical impairment benefits, Idaho Code sections 72-427 to-429,
partial permanent disability benefits and permanent physical impairment benefits
are two separate forms of compensation. In this case, Corgatelli challenges Steel
West's credit for permanent physical impairment benefits paid for the 2005 injury
before any finding or award of a subsequent permanent disability. Therefore,
Idaho Code section 72-406(2) offers no statutory basis for Steel West to receive a
credit for previously paid permanent physical impairment benefits.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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*

*

*

Based on the above reasons, the Court finds that the Commission erred in
awarding Steel West a credit of $11,964 for the permanent physical impairment
benefits paid to Corgatelli in 2006 to 2007 for his 2005 back injury. The Court
declines to rule on the validity of the other credited permanent physical
impairment benefits which were conceded by Corgatelli on appeal.
Corgatelli, 157 Idaho 287, 292-293, 335 P.3d 1150, 1155-1156, (2014). Emphasis Supplied.
When Corgatelli was challenged in Davis, this Court followed up by stating:
The credit disallowed in Corgatelli and the credit here both deprive an injured
worker of benefits provided under the worker's compensation law. Because the
Commission approved the Stipulation without statutory jurisdiction, depriving
Claimant benefits to which he was entitled under the law, the Commission's order
is void.
Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791, 796, 391 P.3d 1261, 1266, (2017).
Without a doubt, the Idaho Industrial Commission has sought to limit the impact of
Corgatelli first by its decision in Davis (reversed on appeal), and then, when the IIC's decision in
Davis was overturned, by the Commission’s decision Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007
(2017). Respondents rely upon this Court’s decision in Mayer v. TPC holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho
223, 370 P.3d 738 (2016) and Dickinson to ask rhetorically, "How, then, is it possible to
reconcile the Corgatelli/Davis decisions and the Mayer/Dickinson cases? This question is easily
answered. First, Mayer makes no mention of either Corgttelli or Davis. Presumably, this
Court would have done so if it had intended to overrule the holdings in two cases of such recent
vintage. Second, although Respondents claim, without citation to any authority, that Corgatelli
and Davis have been distinguished by this Court in Mayer, such is not the case. Respondents
presumably rely on the following footnote contained in Mayer, as that statute so states:
However, the forerunner of Idaho Code section 72-428 was enacted in 1917, and
since that time the Idaho Code has always referred to a disability award, not an
impairment award. Although the term "impairment award" has crept into the
vernacular of the workmen's compensation bar, Idaho's Workmen's Compensation
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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Law only provides for an award of income benefits based on disability, not
impairment. Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 3 n.5, 773 P.2d 269,271 n.5
(1988) ("Income benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Law, with
the exception of retraining benefits, LC. § 72-450, are based upon disability,
either temporary or permanent, but not merely impairment."). A "permanent
impairment" as the definitions themselves make clear, is simply a component of a
"permanent disability." LC. §§ 72-422,-423. Thus, any final award made under
Idaho's Workmen's Compensation Law is properly referred to as a disability
award. Fowler, 116 Idaho at 3 n.5, 773 P.2d at 271 n.5 ("While in some cases the
non-medical factors will not increase the permanent disability rating over the
amount of the permanent impairment rating, the ultimate award of income
benefits is based upon the permanent disability rating, not merely the impairment
rating."); see also Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, 106 Idaho 716,722,682 P.2d
1263, 1269 (1984)."

Mayer, 227, 742. Emphasis supplied. The underlined language contained in the footnote
makes it clear that income benefits include both income benefits for the permanent disability
rating and income benefits for the impairment rating. Undoubtedly permanent impairment is a
factor to be considered in evaluating permanent disability under LC. § 72-425 as that statute so
states. This must logically be so because a person without a permanent impairment would not
be entitled to any permanent disability. However, because something is a factor to be
considered in determining the extent of permanent disability, does not mean that it is subsumed
within permanent disability, as this Court recognized in Corgatelli and Davis. If this were not
the case, then the "matters to be considered" provided in section LC. § 72-430(1) would include
an accident victim's impairment rating. However, LC. § 72-430(1) does not mention permanent
impairment:
§72-430 Permanent disability-Determination of Percentages - Schedule.
Matters to be considered. In determining percentages of permanent disabilities,
account shall be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the disfigurement
if of a kind likely to limit the employee in procuring or holding employment,
include the nature of the physical disablement the disfigurement if of a kind likely
to limit the employee in procuring or holding employment the cumulative effect
of multiple injuries, the occupation of the employee, and his age at the time of
accident causing the injury, or manifestation of the occupational disease,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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consideration being given to the diminished ability of the afflicted employee to
compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area
considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and
other factors as the Commission may deem relevant, ..."
There is a big difference between stating that permanent impairment is a factor to be considered
and concluding that it is subsumed within the extent of permanent disability. Consequently, this
Court's footnote contained in Mayer does not distinguish or overrule either expressly or
implicitly Corgatelli or Davis. Indeed, the footnote in Mayer says merely that a final award is
"properly referred to as a disability award" categorically as a way to refer to both an award for
permanent impairment combined with an award for permanent disability. In sum, this Court's
opinions in Corgatelli and Davis have not been overruled by the footnote in Mayer.
2. The Industrial Commission's determination of the extent of Claimant’s permanent
disability is based on mistakes of law and is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
The Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law by failing to consider Claimant’s
capacity for gainful employment, instead considering only the jobs that he held before his
accident. The Commission considered Claimant’s access to the labor market at the time of the
hearing (which had increased due to Claimant’s self-funded retraining), as without considering
Claimant’s labor market at the time of injury when he was still in high school.

Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation at ¶¶2 and 3, and ¶20 and 21. R. 198, 202-203,
Vol. 2.

Respondents’ contention and the Commission’s holding are wrong on this point.

Court has held:
"Access to a labor market is central to either method of demonstrating that a
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled. Among the relevant non-medical
factors the Commission must consider in determining a disability rating is "the
diminished ability of the afflicted employee to compete in an open labor market
within a reasonable geographical area considering all the personal and economic
circumstances of the employee . . .." Id. (quoting I.C. § 72-430(1))."
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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This

Brown v. Home Depot, 272 P.3d 577, 580, 152 Idaho 605, 608, (2012).

There can be no

assessment of loss of access to the labor market without comparing labor markets before and
after an accident. This Court has stated:
[T]he Commission ignored the plain wording of section 72-430, which requires
that "all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee" be
considered. This clearly includes a Claimant's personal and economic status as an
undocumented immigrant. In addition, the plain language of section 72-425 states
that the evaluation of permanent disability includes the appraisal of the "pertinent
nonmedical factors [as] provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code." Thus, the
Commission must consider all personal circumstances that diminish the ability of
the Claimant to compete in an open labor market.

Marquez v. Pierce Painting, Inc., 164 Idaho 59,423 P.3d 1011, (2018).

It follows that it is a

Claimant's "ability to compete in an open labor market" that is central to the analysis required
under IC 72-430(1) and not the Claimant's history of earnings in an "open labor market."

There

is an inconsistency in treating the Claimant as an individual inevitably bound to arise from the
ashes of an industrial accident because he aspires to go to college, thereby assuming that he has
such an earning potential vastly exceeding what could be earned in a fast-food job, and, at the
same time, concluding that he has not lost anything because he has not demonstrated the
potential to do anything other than work in a fast food restaurant.
The only testimony on Claimant's "ability to compete in an open labor market" was given
by Claimant's vocational expert Douglas Crum.

In his initial report, Mr. Crum stated, "At the

time of the July 30, 2008, industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros was in very good health, capable of
performing medium and heavy physical-demand activities requiring frequent to continuous use
of the bilateral upper extremities for gross and fine work with his hands."

A. 277.

Obviously,

Mr. Oliveros had the capacity for many more jobs than just working at a fast-food restaurant,
even if they were unskilled.

Mr. Crum concluded:

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Based on this analysis, considering Mr. Oliveros’ pre-injury education, language
skills, vocational skills, work history, and presumed pre-injury capacity for
medium to heavy work it appears that Mr. Oliveros had access to approximately
7.3% of the jobs in the labor market. Repeating the above analysis by factoring
in the functional limitations caused by amputation of all 4 fingers of Mr. Oliveros’
dominant right hand, considering the restrictions given by Dr. Gross, it appears
Mr. Oliveros has access to approximately 1.4% of the jobs in this labor market.
This represents an 80% reduction in labor market access.
*

*

*

In my opinion, it does not make sense to use the time of injury wage Mr. Oliveros as a
baseline for a pre and post-injury wage-earning capacity comparison. According to the
US Bureau of the Census, using information from the US Census Department in 2004 the
average wage of a high school graduate was approximately $28,763 for male high school
graduates. The average wage for a male worker with a bachelor’s degree is $50,916.
A. 277-278.
As discussed below, Claimant sought out and paid for retraining after Respondents
denied his request for retraining.

It does not make sense to measure the Claimant's loss of

access to the labor market based solely upon his prior earnings as of the date of his accident,
because he was still in high school.

If a Claimant's labor market after retraining cannot be

measured against his ability to “compete in an open labor market within a reasonable
geographical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee” at
the time of the injury, when he is still in school, then a young worker who has no work history
but is a brilliant student with a full scholarship to MIT who has a severe traumatic brain injury
that precludes all but non-skilled labor would have no permanent disability, but only permanent
impairment.

Such an analysis would make no sense, even if [1] the young worker were to

receive benefits for permanent impairment but no benefits for permanent disability in a
percentage equal to the rating for permanent impairment (the result adopted by the Commission
here consistent with the Commission’s apparent refusal to follow this Court's decisions in
Corgatelli and Davis), or [2] if the young worker were to receive separate benefits for permanent
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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impairment and permanent disability (the result required by Corgatelli and Davis), because at the
time of the accident the young worker had no work history with which to compare the permanent
disability he suffered as a result of the traumatic brain injury.
It is in this light that this Court has held:
Therefore, we hold that the relevant labor market for evaluating the non-medical
factors under I.C. § 72-430 and in determining a Claimant's odd-lot worker status
is the labor market at the time of the hearing.
Brown, Idaho at 609, P.3d at 581.
Brown, relied upon by the Respondents, is distinguishable from this case because it dealt
with a comparison of the determination of labor markets at the time of hearing or immediately
post-accident.

In both instances permanent disability was measured against the Claimant's pre-

injury labor market.

In other words, Brown dealt with when permanent disability was

measured, and this case deals with how it is measured.
3. The Commission erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in disregarding
the opinions of Claimant's vocational expert.
The testimony of Claimant's vocational expert, Douglas Crum (A. 250-269), was
admitted at the second hearing in this case, along with his original report of November 16, 2009,
and his updated report of April 7, 2016.

Respondents argue that the Commission found Mr.

Crum’s opinions conclusory and of little benefit in evaluating Claimant’s "present or probable
future ability to engage in gainful activity." The issue is not what the Commission found, but
whether there was substantial evidence upon which the Commission concluded that Claimant
had suffered no permanent disability above impairment.

R. 214, Vol. 2.

The Commission

abused its discretion in arbitrarily holding, as it did, that the Claimant had not demonstrated a
loss of access to the labor market consistent with the uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony
of Mr. Crum.

This is particularly true because as a matter of law, that the opinion of· an expert
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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may not arbitrarily be rejected.

Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122

(2004). The Commission was not free arbitrarily rejecting the uncontradicted and unimpeached
testimony of Mr. Crum, as it did.
Mr. Crum’s factual testimony laid the foundation for his opinions.
The Commission stated that it accepted Mr. Crum’s factual testimony as true. R. 209,
Vol. 2. Mr. Crum’s factual testimony was as follows: Mr. Crum testified that from November
1987 through October 1994 he was employed by the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation
division is a field consultant.

In that job, he worked with injured workers.

October 1994 as a field consultant and office manager for the Boise office.

He stayed on until
From October 1994

to 1990 he worked as a private vocational rehabilitation consultant for Boise company called
REHABworks.

At that point, he transitioned to more forensic work and continued to do some

job development and job site evaluation.

From July 1999 to the time of his testimony Mr.

Crum had been self-employed as a vocational consultant in private practice doing forensic work
focusing on workers compensation cases.

He works roughly 50/50% for defendants and

Claimants. (A. 251) Mr. Crum's resume was admitted as Exhibit 14 at the 2017 hearing (A.
305-306.) Since 1999, Mr. Crume has been employed as a vocational rehabilitation consultant,
working during 1994 as the office manager and field consultant for the Idaho Industrial
Commission Rehabilitation Division.
Mr. Crum's November 16, 2009 report, A. 273-280, contained a detailed medical history,
summarization of selected medical records, review of additional medical records showing no
pre-existing physical limitations or chronic conditions affecting his activities other than the
subject accident, educational history, work history, future educational plan, and analysis of his
pre-and post-injury labor market access using the Boise Metropolitan statistical area labor
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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market, and his conclusion that Mr. Oliveros had access to 7.3% of the jobs in the labor market.
These are matters of fact.
Based upon medical restrictions given by Dr. Gross Mr. Crum concluded that Claimant
was left with access to approximately 1.4% of the jobs the labor market representing an 80%
reduction in labor market access.

These are calculated values based on the Boise Metropolitan

statistical area labor market, and therefore matters of fact accepted as true by the Commission.
Mr. Crum evaluated Claimant's time of injury position at which year and seven dollars an
hour on a full-time basis.

Mr. Crum testified that did not make sense to use the time of injury

wage for Mr. Oliveros as a baseline for pre-and post-injury wage-earning capacity because based
on U.S. Census department statistics for 2000 for the average wage price school graduate was
approximately $28,763 for mail and the average rate for a male worker with a bachelor’s degree
was $50,916. Mr. Crum reported that based on the Minnesota state Department of Health study
of census results the percentage of disabled persons’ households living at the poverty level was
nearly three times that of the nondisabled population, and the average individual earnings for
disabled persons was 22.8% less than for nondisabled persons. Only 39.4% of people with
disabilities work full-time on a year-round basis.

At least as to the U.S. Census Department and

the Minnesota State Department of Health statistics, these are matters of fact accepted as true by
the Commission.

Mr. Crum testified that according to the US Bureau of the Census, using

information from the US Census Department in 2004 the average wage of a high school graduate
was approximately $28,763 for male high school graduates. The average wage for a male worker
with a bachelor's degree is $50,916. R. 183, Vol. 1.
In his April 7, 2016 follow-up report, A. 281-285, Mr. Crum reviewed the functional
capacity evaluation conducted by Leah Padaca ATC-L who indicated:
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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Based on the dictionary of occupational titles in the Department of Labor Mr.
Oliveros is demonstrating the current capacity to work an eight-hour workday
medium duty with occasional right-hand fine grasp. During the grip
dynamometer, Mr. Oliveros supported the dynamometer on his leg when he did
the first group this right hand, the rest he was able to hold the dynamometer
without needing support. When doing standing tasks, Mr. Oliveros had a
difficult time grabbing washers with his right hand.
A. 281. These are matters of fact accepted as true by the Commission.
Mr. Crum documented Mr. Oliveros's deficits as indicated by the functional capacity
evaluation including a 5-pound grip/carry ability in his right upper extremity and no fine
manipulation.

Beth Rogers, MD declared Mr. Oliveros to medically stable on June 25, 2009,

with a 53% permanent partial impairment the right upper extremity and a 32% permanent partial
impairment rating of the whole person. Again, Dr. Rogers found that Mr. Oliveros had no
history of pre-existing permanent physical restrictions that limited his activities.

These are

matters of fact accepted as true by the Commission.
Mr. Crum reviewed Claimant's educational history post-accident.

Claimant obtained a

GED, attended Lewis Clark State College for two semesters and one summer semester taking
general business classes, started but withdrew from college at Western Idaho because he did not
like their online method of instruction, attended Carrington College in 2012 for about two
months in the pharmacy technology program but did not finish because of the cost of the daily
commute, and earned a certificate of completion in pharmacy technology at the Milan Institute in
Nampa Idaho in September 2012.

A. 282-283.

Claimant completed a one-month internship at

Walgreens, though his hand injury made it difficult for him to count out pills at a production rate.
Claimant failed the pharmacy technology certification Board test twice but indicated to Mr.
Crum that planned to take the test again.

In the meantime, he got a job with KeyBank. Mr.

Oliveros believes that the training he received at Milan Institute and the Walgreens internship
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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was extremely beneficial in terms of his being able to obtain and perform the types of work he
had done since he left that program.

In particular, Mr. Oliveros stated that the customer service

training in computer skills training that he received had been particularly marketable for him.
A. 283. These are matters of fact accepted as true by the Commission.
Significantly, following the Milan Institute program, Mr. Oliveros was able to work as an
account manager at TigerDirect earning $14.42 per hour plus 3% to 6% Commission, Medicap
Pharmacy as a pharmacy technician at $14 per hour, the Terry Riley Clinic as a pharmacy
technician for $13 an hour.

A. 283-284. These are matters of fact accepted as true by the

Commission.
Based upon the sources that he considered and Claimant’s self-funded retraining and job
history, Mr. Crum gave evidence that Claimant had done from an 80% reduction in labor market
access (contained in his November 16, 2009 report, R. 183, Vol 1) to a 77% reduction in labor
market access.

R. 193, Vol. 1.1 Mr. Crum reported that through education/retraining Claimant

Mr. Crum’s measurement of the percentage of the labor market access lost is a factual
finding, as opposed to his opinion regarding the Claimant’s percentage of permanent partial
disability.
1

Mr. Crum stated in his April 2016 report:
Certainly, Mr. Oliveros benefited from [retraining] in terms of significantly
reduced labor market access as well as significant new marketable skills. The
retraining also significantly reduced his level of permanent partial disability.
Assuming Mr. Oliveros current level of education and skills (post retraining)
assuming that a 55% loss of labor market access and a 0% loss of wage earning
capacity, it would be appropriate to propose permanent partial disability inclusive
of impairment of approximately 45% (aside PPI rating is 32% whole person.)
The above level of disability would compensate (to a very minor degree) Mr.
Oliveros for the loss of all the digits of his dominant hand, exclusive of the farm,
and most especially the vocational difficulties this will cause him for the rest of
his life. Mr. Oliveros is currently 25 years of age. Assuming a retirement date
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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Oliveros gained new computer and customer skills since his industrial accident which he used
successfully in employment.

As a result, by including jobs that required those additional skills,

Mr. Crum revised Claimant's loss of access to the labor market down to approximately 55%.

A.

284. These facts, relating to statistical loss of access to the labor market and not Mr. Crum’s
opinion of the percentage of permanent partial disability, are matters of fact accepted as true by
the Commission.
Mr. Crum also stated:
Through retraining, Mr. Oliveros has been able to significantly improve his post
injury wage earning capacity. In the Boise area labor market, the average wage
for Pharmacy Technicians is $15.57 per hour. The entry wage is $12.54 per hour.
He is currently earning $11.75 per hour, with employer supported benefits. He
anticipates that within a few months, he may earn as much as $14.00 per hour.
A. 285. These are matters of fact accepted as true by the Commission.
Mr. Crum’s Opinions
Mr. Crum testified that in his opinion the only way that Mr. Oliveros could successfully
mitigate the effect of his July 2008 industrial injury was through education. "Ideally Mr.
Oliveros should seek a bachelor’s degree.
to earn a good wage in the future.

This would give them a better chance of being able

In my opinion, Mr. Oliveros will probably not be able to find

a job in excess of approximately the federal minimum wage which is currently $7.25 per hour."
R. 183, Vol. 1.

Mr. Crum proposed a two-year retraining program to allow the Claimant to

complete an Associate’s degree in a compatible field.

of 2057 (if he retires at age 67), Mr. Oliveros still has approximately 40 years of
work life ahead of him.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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Mr. Crum stated his opinion in order to arrive at a reasonable and equitable disability
opinion he considered Idaho Code § 72 - 425 defining disability and the pertinent nonmedical
factors provided in I.C. § 72-430.

These factors included disfigurement of a kind likely to

handicap the employee in procuring and holding employment, the diminished ability of Mr.
Oliveros to compete in an open labor market within a reasonably reasonable geographic area
considering all of his personal and economic circumstances, the occupation of Mr. Oliveros at
the time of injury, and his age at the time of injury.

Mr. Crum concluded "in my opinion, the

above retraining program should be considered Mr. Oliveros as the best means of mitigating the
dramatic loss of function of all four fingers on his dominant right hand.

Mr. Crum opined that

without retraining, it is was his opinion that Mr. Oliveros would have a very difficult time
finding and maintaining any sort of good paying job in his labor market.

Mr. Crum concluded

that without retraining, it was his opinion that Mr. Oliveros would reasonably experience
permanent partial disability inclusive of impairment of approximately 75%."

R. 178-184; (A.

273-279).
The Commission abused its discretion by adopting a percentage of permanent partial disability
without a factual basis or the exercise of reason.
Despite the fact that “[a]ccess to a labor market is central to either method of
demonstrating that a Claimant is totally and permanently disabled,” Brown 608, 580, the
Commission simply arbitrarily concluded that Claimant had lost access to no more than 30% of
his labor market and had a permanent partial disability of 25% which was “subsumed” within his
32% whole person permanent impairment rating.

R. 213-214, Vol. 2.

As stated above the uncontradicted testimony may not be arbitrarily disregarded by the
Commission.

Miller, supra.

The Commission’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Recommendation, R. 195-215, while rejecting Mr. Crum’s detailed analysis, contains no analysis
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
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of how the Commission reached the foregoing conclusions regarding the loss of access to the
labor market and permanent partial disability of 25%. These conclusions are simply drawn out
of thin air, and therefore arbitrary and not arrived at through the exercise of reason. As such
they are an abuse of discretion and do not justify disregarding Mr. Crum’s testimony.
Mr. Crum calculated the cost of Mr. Oliveros’s time loss benefits and direct costs
associated with retraining at $42,921.

A. 285.

The Commission erred as a matter of law in concluding that it was required to determine
Claimant’s permanent partial disability at hearing, after retraining for which the Commission
held that Claimant was not entitled to reimbursement from Respondents.
Based on the foregoing facts, Claimant argued that it would be patently unfair to allow
Defendants to sit idly by while Claimant, at his own expense, obtained the post-secondary
education he needed to succeed in his employment, thus driving down his PPD rating, only to
swoop in and use that additional education as a sword to slash Claimant's PPD benefits. Claimant
argued that if Defendants are not required to reimburse Claimant for his "retraining" expenses,
they should not get the benefit of relying on his resultant decreased PPD rating. Since
Defendants do not have to reimburse Claimant for his educational expenses, Claimant asserted
that the Commission should evaluate Claimant's PPD at the time of his reaching maximum
medical improvement. R. 209, Vol. 2. Despite the fact that Claimant’s access to the relevant
labor market actually increased after obtaining additional education to become a pharmacy
technician, the Commission held that Brown, supra, required it to use the labor market at the
time of hearing in determining permanent partial disability. R. 210, Vol. 2.
Therefore, the Court reasoned, in order to assess the injured worker's "present"
ability to engage in gainful activity, it necessarily follows that the labor market, as
it exists at the time of hearing, is the labor market which must be considered.
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R. 210, Vol. 2. However, this reading of Brown ignores this Court’s caveat, applicable in this
case:
Granted, there may be instances where a market other than the Claimant's residence at the
time of the hearing is relevant to the I.C. § 72-430(1) inquiry, and such determinations
should be made on a case by case basis based on individual facts and circumstances. See
e.g. Lyons v. Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977) (court
allowed evidence from market vacated by Claimant after injury as well as market of
residence at the time of the hearing). Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337, 870 P.2d at 1296.
Brown, 609, 581. The Commission failed to recognize that the time at which PPD had to be
evaluated was an act of discretion, thereby abusing its discretion.
Though this Court has yet to rule on this issue, Claimant contends that the Commission
erred as a matter of law in measuring his permanent partial disability as of the date of the
hearing, almost nine years after his industrial accident and after retraining that Claimant paid for
himself. This follows logically from the fact that I.C. § 72-430 requires the Commission to
determine permanent partial disability “consideration being given to the diminished ability of
the afflicted employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical
area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee.” If the
Commission’s decision in this case stands, giving the benefit of retraining to Respondents
but not requiring them to reimburse Claimant for the cost of that retraining, what incentive is
there within the Idaho Workers Compensation Act for a Claimant to better himself at his own
expense through education in a protracted case? Would the Claimant in such a case not be
better off going through the lengthy and expensive process of piecemeal hearings on
retraining and disability rather than taking the initiative of retraining himself and seeking
reimbursement at the disability hearing as Claimant has here? Certainly, this interpretation
of the Act does not comport with the requirement that the provisions of the workers'
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compensation law be liberally construed in favor of the employee, to provide sure and certain
relief for injured workers and their families and dependents. I.C. § 72-201, Davaz, infra.
4. Retraining
Following his industrial accident, Claimant had a permanent impairment rating of 32%.
R. 198 Vol. 2. At the time of his industrial accident, July 30, 2008, Claimant had not yet
graduated from high school. In addition to his high school studies, Claimant worked part-time in
a fast-food restaurant, earning between $7.00 and $7.50 per hour. R. 198 Vol. 2.

After being

denied retraining benefits by Respondents, Claimant took out loans and completed a course of
study to become a pharmacy tech.

This program was highly successful.

About two months

after obtaining his PT certificate, Claimant found work at Terry Reilly Pharmacy in Nampa as a
PT. His starting salary was $11.80 per hour, with paid medical, vision, and dental benefits after
two months. Claimant worked for Terry Reilly Pharmacy for two years.

R. 200 Vol. 2.

In

December 2016, Claimant found employment with Albertsons Pharmacy's corporate offices in
Boise. At the time of the hearing on February 22, 2017, Claimant worked as a third-party
coordinator for Albertsons, where he processes claims for pharmacies when there are issues at
the point of purchase. Claimant continued to be employed in this position at the time of the
hearing. His hourly wage is $15.87 plus health, dental, vision, and 401(k) benefits after three
months. Claimant enjoys working there and plans on staying with Albertson's long-term if
possible. After one year of employment, there are multiple opportunities for advancement with
the company. R. 200 Vol. 2.

While Mr. Crum concluded in his initial report that Claimant had

sustained a permanent partial disability of 75%, R. 184, Vol. 1, he concluded in his updated 2016
report that through retraining Claimant had reduced his permanent partial disability to 45%.
194, Vol. 1.
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R.

The Commission erred as a matter of law in holding that a Claimant must have had an
"established 'field, skill or vocation' at the time of his accident to be eligible for retraining
benefits under LC. § 72-450.
Nevertheless, the Commission held that Claimant's retraining was not reimbursable
under LC. § 72-450.

The Commission erred as a matter of law in holding that a Claimant must

have had an "established 'field, skill or vocation' at the time of his accident from which he was
thereafter precluded by his injuries" in order to be eligible for retraining benefits."
2.

LC. § 72-450 contains no such express requirement.

R. 202, Vol.

As for any argument that contains an

implied requirement to that effect, this Court's prior cases blunt that argument:
More specifically, we must liberally construe the provisions of the workers'
compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose
for which the law was promulgated. Sprague v. Caldwell Transp., Inc., 116 Idaho
720, 721, 779 P.2d 395, 396 (1989). The purpose of the workers'
compensation law is to provide sure and certain relief for injured workmen and
their families and dependents. LC. § 72-201.
Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296, (1994).

Even if LC. § 72-450 did contain a requirement that a Claimant must have had an
"established 'field, skill or vocation' at the time of his accident to be eligible for retraining
benefits," the Commission held:
For starters, Claimant did not have an established "field, skill, or vocation" at the
time of his accident from which he was thereafter precluded due to his injuries.
Arguably, Claimant's time-of-injury skills centered on working for fast food
establishments while going to school. After the accident, he returned to the fast
food industry, at least temporarily. Thus, he proved he could still pursue those
skills required to work at a fast food restaurant. His one plus day's experience at
Rule Steel did not imbue Claimant with skills, was not his chosen field, and was
never considered by him to be a place where he intended to pursue his vocation.
Instead, both pre- and post-accident, Claimant had aspirations to attend college
after high school. Claimant's fulfilled desire of attending institutions of higher
learning after high school hardly fits the common definition of "retraining into a
different field, skill, or vocation.
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R. 202, Vol. 2. Emphasis supplied. It was an error oflaw for the Commission to hold that
Claimant's pre-injury aspirations disqualified him from retraining benefits under LC. § 72-450.
The Commission erred as a matter of law in holding that Claimant's work at fast-food
establishments was not a "field," "skill," or "vocation" under LC. § 72-450
The Commission erred as a matter oflaw in holding that Claimant's work at fast-food
establishments was not a "field," "skill," or "vocation." The Commission erred as a matter of
law in concluding "For starters, Claimant did not have an established "field, skill, or vocation" at
the time of his accident from which he was thereafter precluded due to his injuries." R. 202, Vol.
2.

Ballantine's Law Dictionary defines "vocation" as "A trade, profession, occupation, or

calling, whether lawful or unlawful" (Citing 43 ALR 800; 50 ALR 1176.) and "skill" as "Ability;
proficiency. Knowledge coupled with the ability to apply it." Certainly, Claimant had the
knowledge and ability to perform the work that he did while in high school at fast-food
restaurants. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 311.472-010, defines "Fast-Foods Worker"
and sets forth the skills required to do that job. Indeed, the Commission itself referred to
Claimant's pre-injury work as involving "skills":
Arguably, Claimant's time-of-injury skills centered on working for fast food
establishments while going to school. After the accident, he returned to the fast food
industry, at least temporarily. Thus he proved he could still pursue those skills required to
work at a fast food restaurant.

R. 202, Vol. 2.

Emphasis supplied.

Finally, the only evidence admitted during the 2017

hearing regarding skills was provided by Claimant's vocational expert, Douglas Crum:
Mr. Oliveros's work history, education and experienced have resulted in a modest
set of residual transferable vocational skills to lighter employment. Mr. Oliveros
has a narrow range of employment experience. He has yet to graduate from high
school. Mr. Oliveros's injury occurred before he had a chance to begin a career.
A. 279. Emphasis Supplied.
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Claimant's time-of-injury work involved working part-time for fast food establishments
while going to high school. No one could seriously call that experience a "field, skill, or
vocation." The Commission found that after the accident, he returned to the fast food industry,
at least temporarily.

R. 202, Vol. 2.

Thus, it concluded, that Claimant proved he could still

pursue those skills required to work at a fast food restaurant.

This conclusion was not based on

substantial evidence. Claimant’s actual testimony at hearing on this point was as follows:
Q. So when you had your accident at work on July 30, 2008, and you lost -- had
the traumatic amputation of portions of four fingers on your right hand; is that
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, are you right-hand dominant or left-hand dominant?
A. I'm right-hand dominant.
Q. So after you had that accident, what kind of work did you have?
A. At the time of the accident or afterwards?
Q. Afterwards.
A. After? I did Dairy Queen for a couple of months. Also at WDS, I worked
there for a couple of months.
Q. Okay. Let me take you through those, to begin with. First of all, I think
that it is in the record that your time -- at the time of your injury, you were still in
high school, and you were earning $7 an hour; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Were you working a 40-hour week, then, while you were in high school or
was it -A. No.
Q. -- part-time?
A. Part-time.
Q. And when you went back to work at Dairy Queen in April of 2008, tell us
what kind of work you were doing.
A. Just cashier, working the drive-thru, fast food -- fast-food place, so just
nothing -- nothing heavy, just -- other than that.
Q. And you worked there into July of 2008; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, did the loss of -- partial loss of four fingers on your dominant hand
interfere in any way with your ability to do the work at Dairy Queen?
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A. Yes.
Q. Will you explain how.
A. Just after that the accident, I mean, I had a cast on, so, obviously, I was
learning on how to use my left hand more, as in picking up stuff, grabbing stuff,
using the cashier, just anything that -- that has to do of using my right hand. I,
you know, obviously, at the time, I was learning on how to use my left hand for
that kind of stuff. So I felt like it was -- it did, you know, disturb me.
Q. From your point of view as a layperson -- and I'm asking you now just in
terms of your own perception, it's not anything that you may have heard from an
expert, such as the doctors in this case -- how has the injury to your dominant
hand affected your ability to use the hand for things that require, you know,
normal fingers and grip and things like that?
A. I'd say it affected it in many ways. I mean, pretty much anything I do in life
it can affect it. My job-wise, physically-wise, just going out, you know, people
are asking what happened, and it's not just my hand, it's also the scar. So I have
to pretty much hide it. Just gripping, you know, any kind of small stuff, like a
screwdriver or a little nail. Heavy stuff, also, I always have to support with my
left hand. Just pretty much anything I do it's affected.
Oliveros Depo. p. 30, l. 20 -33 l. 8. A. 238.
The Commission erred as a matter of law in holding that a Claimant has no permanent disability
if the Claimant can return to his or her time-of-injury job in a limited capacity.
The Commission also erred as a matter of law in holding that proof that Claimant could
return to working at a fast-food restaurant in a limited capacity meant that he had no permanent
disability.

The import of this conclusion is that the Commission focused on Claimant’s pre-

accident skills, as opposed to Claimant’s diminished ability to compete in an open labor market
within a reasonable geographical area considering all his personal and economic circumstances
of the employee, and other factors as the Commission may deem relevant.

I.C. § 72-430.

Regarding the Claimant’s self-financed retraining to become a pharmacy technician, the
Commission also erred as a matter of law in concluding, “both pre- and post-accident, Claimant
had aspirations to attend college after high school. Claimant's fulfilled desire of attending
institutions of higher learning after high school hardly fits the common definition of "retraining
into a different field, skill, or vocation." R. 202, Vol. 2.

Claimant is not aware of any authority
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supporting either of those propositions; propositions which the Idaho Industrial Commission
considered to be the law.
The Commission erred as a matter of law in holding that I.C. § 72-450 does not encompass
retraining to restore access to the relevant labor market.
The Commission also erred as a matter of law in construing I.C. § 72-450.

The

Commission held:
The next issue confronting Claimant as regards the language of the statute in question is
the fact that he did not need retraining in order to restore his previous earning capacity.
At the time of his accident, Claimant had a minimum wage earning capacity. Had he not
been injured, there is no proof Claimant, without further education, would have likely
started his post-high school career at anything other than a low to minimum wage job.
While his further education certainly enhanced his earning ability, Claimant's earning
capacity was not seriously undermined by his industrial accident, as admitted by
Claimant's vocational rehabilitation expert.
R. 203 Vol. 2. While I.C. § 72-450 does use the term “earning capacity,” and while Claimant’s
expert did state that he had not loss of earning capacity resulting from his accident (as opposed to
loss of access to his labor market) common sense compels the conclusion that retraining also
applies to restoring access to a labor market.

This Court’s recent decision in Marquez v. Pierce

Painting, Inc., 164 Idaho 59, 423 P.3d 1011, (2018) reinforces the requirement that the
Commission liberally construe the provisions of the workers' compensation law in favor of the
employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for which the law was promulgated, that being
to provide sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families and dependents. (
A construing court's primary duty is to give effect to the legislative intent and purpose
underlying a statute. Moreover, the court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider
all sections of applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the [L]egislature. It is
incumbent upon the court to give the statute an interpretation that will not deprive it of its
potency. In construing a statute, not only must we examine the literal wording of
the statute, but we also must study the statute in harmony with its objective. (citations
omitted). Thus, we review the Act according to its plain meaning, while not losing sight
of its "potency."
Emphasis supplied. Marquez, supra.

See, also, I.C. § 72-201, Davis, supra)
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The Commission erred as a matter of law in holding that to qualify for retraining benefits under
LC. § 72-450 a Claimant must have been trained in a career at the time of injury.
In denying Claimant retraining benefits, the Commission erroneously concluded as a
matter of law that retraining does not include training for an individual who has not previously
been trained in a career.
The Referee, but not the Claimant, uses quotation marks around the word
retraining, since the undersigned cannot legitimately call Claimant's postsecondary education retraining. Retraining implies Claimant was previously
trained in some career, and had to be retrained, i.e. trained again, due to the
accident in question. Technically, while Claimant obtained work-skill training
post-accident, he did not receive retraining in the popular sense of the word.

R. 196 Vol. 2.

Emphasis supplied.

There is no basis for this holding in LC. § 72-450.

The Commission erred as a matter oflaw in holding that LC. § 72-450 contains a "but for"
requirement.
In this case, the Commission erred as a matter of law in holding:
[I]t appears Claimant's post-secondary education was not directed by his injury.
Claimant had a vision of continuing his education after high school even before
his accident. There is nothing in the record to establish that "but for" the accident,
Claimant would have chosen a different path after high school. To his credit,
Claimant did not abandon his pre-accident goals because of his permanent
disability, but rather found a way to achieve them in spite of his disability.
Unfortunately, within the parameters of the Act, there is no provision for
rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull themselves up after a life-changing
accident. To require Defendants to pay for schooling that was part of Claimant's
preinjury planning even without the accident is not proper.

R. 204, Vol. 2.

Emphasis supplied.

The Commission erred as a matter of law in holding that an injured worker is not entitled to
retraining if, prior to the worker's accident, he had aspirations to improve himself through
education.
The Commission also erred as a matter of law in holding that an injured worker is not
entitled to retraining if, before the worker's accident, he had aspirations to improve himself
through education.

This misconstruction goes to the heart of the Commission's determination
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that plaintiff suffered no permanent partial disability beyond his 32% physical impairment - a
conclusion which seems to be drawn out of thin air given the Commission's rejection of the
portions of the testimony of Douglas Crum that supported Claimant's case, and the lack of any
other evidence in the record supporting this finding.

Indeed, with the exception of his part-time

work at Dairy Queen (seep. 20 below) and one job at a call center that lasted a few months, after
his industrial accident, Claimant "unsuccessfully sought work at numerous banks for a teller
position, at call centers, and for jobs operating machines." R. 199, Vol. 1.
In this case, the Commission erred by not considering Claimant's retraining in
determining his permanent partial disability:
We first address Claimant's argument that the Commission erred in denying him
retraining benefits. If Campbell is correct that the Commission erred in this
regard, then other parts of the Commission's order relating to the amount of the
award for permanent partial disability are also affected. LC. § 72-450 states that
during the period of retraining "the employer shall continue to pay the disabled
employee, as a subsistence benefit, temporary total or temporary partial disability
benefits as the case may be." It is only after the retraining is completed that the
employee is to be rated for permanent disability. Accordingly, if the
Commission erred in analyzing the claim for retraining benefits, it could affect the
permanent disability award as well.
Campbell v. Key Millwork & Cabinet Co., 116 Idaho 609,613, 778 P.2d 731, 735, (1989).

Emphasis supplied.

The Commission erred as a matter of law in concluding that an individual

who finances his own retraining is not entitled to retraining benefits under LC. § 72-450, which
permits the Commission to "authorize or order such retraining."

The Commission held:

24. In the present case, Claimant was at a cross roads (sic.) when confronted with
his postinjury permanent disability and no real work skills. He could have
lamented his condition, maximized his perceived disabilities and focused on what
he could not do. Conversely, Claimant could have resolved to not let his injury
define him. Faced with these alternatives," Claimant chose to discover his
capabilities, adapt to his situation, further his education, and strive to make a life
for himself and his new family. In the process, he incurred substantial educational
expenses.
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25. Defendants concede that Claimant overcame his obstacles, gained a useful
education, obtained work, and started what hopefully will be a successful career.
However, they argue that Claimant did exactly what he wanted to do even before
his accident - get college training and transition that education into a career.
Defendants should not be required to pay for Claimant's education when it was
not pursued as an alternative to what he would have done but for his injuries.
Defendants' obligation is defined statutorily, not charitably or equitably.
26. While both positions on this issue have merit, and while the liberal
construction of the Act should not automatically preclude reimbursement of
training expenses in this unique situation, nevertheless it appears Claimant's postsecondary education was not directed by his injury. Claimant had a vision of
continuing his education after high school even before his accident. There is
nothing in the record to establish that "but for" the accident, Claimant would have
chosen a different path after high school. To his credit, Claimant did not abandon
his pre-accident goals because of his permanent disability, but rather found a way
to achieve them in spite of his disability. Unfortunately, within the parameters of
the Act, there is no provision for rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull
themselves up after a life changing accident. To require Defendants to pay for
schooling that was part of Claimant's preinjury planning even without the accident
is not proper.
27. Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to retraining benefits for his
postsecondary education.

R. 203-204, Vol. 2.

The Commission's conclusion that "within the parameters of the Act, there

is no provision for rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull themselves up after a lifechanging accident" is an error of law.
The Commission erred as a matter of law in basing its decision on its assumptions about
Claimant's starting wage after high school rather than Claimant's relevant labor market.
The Commission erred as a matter of law in basing its decision on the premise that "Had
he not been injured, there is no proof Claimant, without further education, would have likely
started his post-high school career at anything other than a low to minimum wage job."

Vol. 2.

R. 202,

The issue is not what Claimant would have started at had he not had his accident, but

what his labor market was after the accident.
accident and after retraining.

The proper comparison is between his status post-

There is no proof that even after the initial accident, Claimant had
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the same labor market as he did pre-accident.

Indeed, the only evidence on this point was

provided by Mr. Crum in his first report before retraining:
I have performed an evaluation of Mr. Oliveros' pre- and post-injury labor market
access, using the Boise metropolitan statistical area labor market. This labor
market is comprised of Ada and Canyon Counties. Based on this analysis,
considering Mr. Oliveros' pre-injury education, language skills, vocational skills,
work history, and presumed pre-injury capacity for medium to heavy work it
appears that Mr. Oliveros had access to approximately 7.3% of the jobs in the
labor market. Repeating the above analysis by factoring in the functional
limitations caused by amputation of all 4 fingers of Mr. Oliveros' dominant right
hand, considering the restrictions given by Dr. Gross, it appears Mr. Oliveros has
access to approximately 1.4% of the jobs in this labor market. This represents an
80% reduction in labor market access.
R. 182-183, Vol. 1.
At the time of the subject injury, Mr. Oliveros was between his junior and senior
years of high school, performing a summer job. Mr. Oliveros' time-of-injury
position paid $7.00 per hour on a full-time basis. As far as I know, Mr. Oliveros
did not receive any employer-supported benefits. In my opinion, it does not make
sense to use the time of injury wage Mr. Oliveros as a baseline for a pre and postinjury wage-earning capacity comparison. According to the US Bureau of the
Census, using information from the US Census Department in 2004 the average
wage of a high school graduate was approximately $28,763 for male high school
graduates. The average wage for a male worker with a bachelor's degree is
$50,916. As a result of the subject industrial injury, Mr. Oliveros will not be able
to perform jobs similar to the work his father performs, i.e. manual laboring
positions. He simply does not have the manual dexterity to do those kinds of jobs.
According to the Minnesota State Department of Health in a study of census 2000
results, the percent of disabled persons households who lived under the poverty
level was nearly 3 times that of non-disabled populations (15% vs. 6%); average
individual earnings for disabled persons was 22.8% less ($26,978 vs. $34,951).
The percentage of persons with disabilities who are not working was more than
twice as high as individuals with no disabilities. Only 39.4% of people with
disabilities worked full time on a year round basis. The poverty rate for person
with disabilities was noted to be twice as high as the poverty rate for adults
without disabilities. The report goes on to indicate that people with disabilities
find it more difficult to complete post-high school education because they have
less earning capacity than their peers. There is no doubt that the severe injuries to
Mr. Oliveros' dominant hand will severely impact his vocational options for the
rest of his life.
R. 183, Vol. 1.
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CONCLUSION
Claimant has lost all the way around in this tragic case. Initially, he was denied the
partial finger prosthetics he needed as a high school student to deal with the psychological
effects of the disfiguring partial amputation of four of his fingers. Next, he was denied
reimbursement for retraining that actually benefited the Respondents. Finally, he was not
awarded a penny for his loss of access to the labor market.
To an extent, Claimant received nothing as a result of his 2017 hearing, because the
Commission failed to follow the precedent laid down by this Court in Corgatelli and Davis. It
should be obvious that the compensation that one receives for permanent impairment resulting
from the loss of a body part, is not the loss of access to the labor market compensable
contemplated by I.C. § 72-423, which states, “‘Permanent disability’ or ‘under a permanent
disability’ results when the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or
absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can
be reasonably expected.” Under I.C. § 72-425, Permanent disability is an appraisal of the
injured employee’s present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is
affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors.
“Affected by” is not synonymous with “including.”
The decision of the Commission is riddled with errors of law that undermine virtually
every finding it made in this case. Further, the Commission abused its discretion in multiple
ways, as described above. The Commissions conclusions of law were not supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
The decision of the Commission on the issues of retraining and the extent of permanent
atrial disability should be reversed, and this case should be remanded for reconsideration
consistent with Corgatelli and Davis, and instructions which this Court should give regarding the
proper construction of the relevant sections of the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Act discussed
herein.
Respectfully submitted September 27, 2018.
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/s/ Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
SEINIGER LAW
Attorneys for the Claimant/Appellant
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